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FINANCE COMPANIES AS HOLDERS IN DUE
COURSE OF CONSUMER PAPER
WILLIAM C. JONESt
Few legal principles are better developed or better known than the
one that bona fide purchasers for value of negotiable instruments that
are properly negotiated to them-in other words, holders in due
course-take the instruments free of defenses that might be available
between the original parties. Not only is the rule well known, but it
is easy to come within it. Few seem so aware of this as finance com-
panies. Nearly every sale they finance-and the total amount of
money involved runs to billions'-involves a negotiable instrument,
and the instrument is usually handled in such a way that the finance
company has every reason to suppose that it has become, as it in-
tended, a holder in due course. Yet there are a significant number of
cases (though nothing approaching a majority) that indicate that
these efforts are in vain, and that a finance company that purchases
a negotiable promissory note from, say, an automobile dealer in the
usual manner of financing a consumer purchase, is not a holder in due
course of the instrument even though there is no suggestion of actual
bad faith on its part. It is the purpose here to examine the cases in
this area, both those that give the finance company the status of a
holder in due course, and those that do not.2
First, however, it seems advisable to outline the normal fact situa-
t Assistant Professor of Law, Washington University School of Law.
1. In December, 1957, there was $16,681,000,000 outstanding in automobile in-
stallment loans, and $11,621,000,000 in installment credit arising out of sales of
other consumer goods. 44 Fed. Res. Bull. 182 (1958).
2. The matter has been considered by several commentators. The most ex-
haustive treatment is contained in an annotation entitled "Transferee of commer-
cial paper given by purchaser of chattel and secured by conditional sale, retention
of title, or chattel mortgage, as subject to defenses which chattel purchaser could
assert against seller" in 44 A.L.R.2d 8 (1955). The great bulk of the relevant
cases are contained in this annotation. It should be pointed out, however, that the
annotation considers a great many problems that arise in the connection with the
assignment of notes secured by chattel security devices which are not peculiar
to finance companies--or, for that matter, that are not peculiar to secured notes,
but are common to transfers of a negotiable instrument. There are such problems
as taking the instrument after maturity, id. at 101-04, the effect of a signature of
a maker obtained by fraud, id. at 42-43, etc. See also 34 N.C.L. Rev. 496 (1956);
Note, Consumer Sales Financing: Placing the Risk for Defective Goods, 102 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 782 (1954); Note, Finance Company as a Holder in Due Course, 28
Notre Dame Law. 251 (1953).
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tion that underlies the cases.3 It is a commonplace that a tremendous
number of the sales of goods to consumers are not made for cash but
on credit.4 The types of credit devices that can be, and are, used, are
legion. In connection with the more expensive items such as automo-
biles, however, the usual method is for the purchaser (buyer) to pay
a certain percentage of the purchase price in cash, and to sign a note
to the order of the seller for the balance., Nowadays this note usually
requires repayment in installments that amortize the remaining prin-
cipal due as well as provide for interest (or "carrying" or "service
charge" as it is usually called in deference to the usury statutes).
Along with the note, the buyer will sign some sort of chattel security
device such as a chattel mortgage, conditional sales contract, or bail-
ment lease, which gives the payee of the note a lien (in fact, whatever
the theoretical nature of the interest may be) on the item sold. The
buyer gets possession of the chattel; the note and security device are
then assigned to a financer. The financer may of course be a bank
engaged in general banking activities (or, for that matter anyone).
But the financer is at least as, if not more likely, to be a finance com-
3. The basic sources for this information are: Plummer & Young, Sales Fi-
nance Companies and Their Credit Practices 105-08 (1940); Seidman, Finance
Companies and Factors 126-38 (Rev. ed. 1956) (hereafter Seidman); Consumer
Credit Department, American Bankers Association, Home Appliance Financing
5-33, passim (1945); Phelps, Instalment Sales Financing: Its Service to the
Dealer 21-37, 52-96 (1953).
4. The total amount of consumer credit outstanding in December 1957 was
$44,798,000,000. 44 Fed. Res. Bull. 180 (1958).
5. Mr. Seidman states that the practice nowadays among finance companies
is not to use negotiable notes in consumer installment sales. Hence, there would
be no question of the finance company being a holder in due course. Seidman
134. Mr. Seidman, as President of the National Commercial Finance Conference,
Inc., is certainly in a position to know. However, everything else that I have
been able to find indicates that negotiable instruments are used. Thus, the note
forms recommended by the American Bankers Association are negotiable. Con-
sumer Credit Department, American Bankers Association, Home Appliance Fi-
nancing 23 (1945). See also the conditional sales form of The Pennsylvania Com
pany in Honnold, Cases on Sales and Sales Financing, 416-19 (1954). See also
G.M.A.C. v. Daigle, 225 La. 123, 72 So. 2d 319 (1954) (chattel mortgage and ne-
gotiable note); Associates' Discount Corp. v. Goetzinger, 245 Iowa 326, 62 N.W.2d
191 (1954) (conditional sales contract and an apparently negotiable note) ; Com-
mercial Credit Corp. v. Biagi, 11 Ill. App. 2d 80, 136 N.E.2d 580 (1956) (con-
ditional sales contract and note). These are recent cases. The finance companies
were large concerns. The finance companies furnished the forms that were used
and the notes were negotiable. However, the GMAC conditional sales form in
Braucher, Southerland, & Willcox, Commercial Transactions: Text, Forms, Stat-
utes 36-40 (1953), does not include a note on the same piece of paper. Whether
one is designed to be used with it does not appear. If this tendency does exist
there is all the more reason to change the legal rules discussed here, since even
their beneficiaries realize that they are no longer applicable.
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pany which has this as its primary, if not sole, activity.6 Both note
and security device are almost always retained by the first assignee,
the financer, though they can be reassigned. The note will probably
be transferred by the seller by endorsement either with or without
recourse and the security device will be assigned with it. If it is pur-
chased with recourse, the dealer holds the entire credit risk and must
pay the financer if the buyer does not. If without recourse, the fin-
ancer holds the credit risk and will not be able to look to the seller for
reimbursement. An intermediate method is for the note and security
device to be transferred with a repurchase agreement., Under such
an agreement the dealer will repurchase the chattel if the finance com-
pany repossesses it at a price equal to the amount of the loan unpaid.
The dealer has no liability for the debt as such. This may enable him
to escape showing the amount of the debt as a contingent liability on
his books.
The seller will not usually advance credit to the buyer-and hence
the note will not be signed-until he has received approval from the
financer that it will buy the note of this particular buyer. The blank
forms are provided by the finance company and usually contain a
printed assignment or endorsement clause in which the name of the
finance company is printed as the endorsee or assignee. The note may
be "payable at" the office of the finance company. The finance com-
pany will furnish the seller with a table, by means of which he can
compute the monthly installments that will be charged in any par-
ticular transaction, and a variety of other materials (having to do
with insurance, refinancing, etc.). Although these purchases of con-
sumer paper may be isolated transactions, they usually are not. They
are normally carried on under an agreement of some type between
the finance company and the seller providing for many such sales.
Frequently this involves the financing by the finance company of the
dealer's purchase of cars, or whatever, from the manufacturer. 9 In-
6. In December, 1957, $15,496,000,000 of automobile installment paper was
outstanding; $7,470,000,000 was held by finance companies; $6,389,000,000 by
commercial banks; $529,000,000 was in the hands of dealers. I cannot get the
figures to add up. This may be because the total figure was compiled separately,
perhaps at different dates from the separate figures; or, I may have overlooked
some catchall category. However, the proportions appear approximately correct.
7. Interview with official in St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank.
8. Seidman 134-36. Forms "CC," "DD," "EE" and "FF." These arrangements
are subject to immense variations.
9. One form of agreement provides in part: "We will repurchase any item of
paper sold to you under this agreement on your request made at any time after
default by the purchaser in the payment of any instalment continuing uncured
for sixty-one days or more; or, if we breach any warranty in said paper, assign-
ment, endorsement or any provision of this or any other agreement as to said
paper and shall pay you an amount equal to your original investment, plus un-
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deed the American Bankers Association recommends that banks buy
all a dealer's paper. In order words, the whole transaction is, or may
be, similar to the financing of a dealer or manufacturer by means of
a combination of loans secured by inventory (field warehousing, fac-
toring, etc.) and an assignment of accounts receivable. The retail
paper is the more lucrative business and frequently the finance com-
pany will finance or "floor-plan" the dealer in order to get him to
assign the retail notes to it.o This pattern of doing business arose
during the 1920's when automobiles began to be sold in tremendous
numbers, on "time," and it does not seem to have changed in essentials
since then.
The problem that is under consideration arises for the most part
when there is a default by the buyer on his note and the financer at-
tempts to enforce the obligation. The buyer defends by asserting a
defense that would be good against an action by the seller, such as
fraud, failure or lack of consideration, payment, or rescission. Usu-
ally the seller has become insolvent or has absconded and hence if
the financer wins against the buyer, the buyer's remedy against the
seller is worthless. Similarly any warranty that the seller may have
made to the financer is worthless. The financer asserts that it is a
holder in due course, and consequently holds the instrument free of
such defenses. Generally it wins, but occasionally it does not. In some
of the cases in which it does not, it appears that the court regards
the type of transaction described as being such that one in the position
of the financer cannot be a holder in due course.
The principal difficulty in analysing these decisions is that there
are many possible reasons why a financer would not be a holder in
due course quite apart from the peculiarities of its relationship with
the dealer. For example, there is always a possibility that the note
is not negotiable because it is tied in too closely with the transaction
and hence is not an "unconditional" promise." Again, the financer
collected accrued interest and any expenses of collection incurred by you after
default by us, less all principal sums received by you on such paper (the aggre-
gate amount thereof hereinafter referred to as 'repurchase price'). Payment is
to be made within 30 days after your request for repurchase .... All paper re-
purchased by us hereunder shall be reassigned to us without recourse to you and
without warranties, express or implied, and shall be delivered to us against pay-
ment to you in cash therefor at your office .... We waive presentment, demand,
notice and protest as to all paper and consent that you may grant extensions of
time and otherwise handle making collections in accordance with your business
judgment." Seidman 134, Form "CC"--the agreement runs in form from dealer
to financer.
10. Seidman 137-38; Phelps, Instalment Sales Financing: Its Services to the
Dealer 31-37 (1953); Kripke, Inventory Financing of Hard Goods, 1956 Ill. L.
Forum 580.
11. E.g., Von Nordheim v. Cornelius, 129 Neb. 719, 262 N.W. 832 (1935).
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may have taken the note after maturity, 2 or with actual notice of de-
fenses-not in good faith.13 Or, perhaps the consideration it gave
was not "value" in the sense of section 52 of the Negotiable Instru-
ment Law, although this is unlikely. Even when these cases are
eliminated, however, there remains a residue of cases in which it ap-
pears that the financer-seller relationship is alone responsible for the
decision of the court.
So far as I have been able to find out, there are cases in eleven
states4 in which it has been held that the financer was not a holder
in due course, or, in any event, purchased the paper subject to de-
fenses because of the peculiarities of the relationship described here.
I have found cases in nine states that consider this relationship be-
tween financer and buyer and hold for the financer." In three of these
states there are cases going both ways (which do not overrule each
other) .1' In every state except twol7 in which there has been a de-
cision for the financer there are other decisions in which, on what
appear to be similar facts, an opposite result was reached. Usually,
in such cases, the point was not raised but is inherent in the facts.
Furthermore, although I have been unable to find any cases in the
remaining states that have dealt with the issue expressly, there are,
in all but eight"s of these states, cases involving indistinguishable
facts in which the point was apparently not raised. Of these forty-one
states (including the District of Columbia) all but six' 9 have cases that
12. E.g., Webb v. Orme, 35 Ga. App. 784, 134 S.E. 841 (1926).
13. E.g., Davis v. Commercial Credit Corp., 87 Ohio App. 311, 94 N.E.2d 718
(1950).
14. Since relatively few states have considered the problem of whether a
financer in this situation is a holder in due course, separately from other pur-
chasers of negotiable instruments, it is not felt that the normal citation of de-
cisions that hold for one party or the other is meaningful. Consequently, all of
the decisions that have been found have been placed in an appendix to this article
where they have been arranged by states. A somewhat fuller discussion of the
cases than would be feasible in ordinary footnote citation is thereby made pos-
sible. References to holdings will be made to states rather than to cases and the
reader is referred to the appendix to see the cases in support of the statement.
Thus, there are cases in the following states that have considered the question of
whether a financer can be a holder in due course and have decided that he cannot:
Arkansas, California, the District of Columbia, Florida, Iowa, Louisiana (pos-
sibly), Michigan (possibly), Missouri (possibly), New York, North Carolina,
Pennsylvania (possibly), Texas (possibly).
15. Alabama, Indiana (possibly), Louisiana, Michigan (possibly), New Jersey
(possibly), New York, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Wisconsin.
16. Louisiana, Michigan, New York.
17. California and North Carolina.
18. Colorado, Connecticut, Kentucky, Maine, Nevada, Oregon, Utah, Wash-
ington.
19. California, Iowa, Maryland, Minnesota, New Mexico, North Dakota.
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decide for the financer, although the issue of his peculiar status is not
raised. Similarly, in addition to the cases that hold for the buyer
expressly because of the financer-seller-buyer relationship, there are
cases in eighteen states that decide for the buyer on some other
ground.20
Clearly then, the financer wins more often than not, but loses in a
significant number of cases. This is the result that the general law of
negotiable instruments would lead one to expect. There is a note in
proper form endorsed by the payee to the financer for value. Accom-
panying the note-usually as a part of the same piece of paper, but
separated by a dotted line-is a security device such as a chattel
mortgage or conditional sale contract. Normally, the finance company
was not a party to the sale in the sense that none of its officers was
present when the sale took place or during the negotiations between
buyer and seller that preceded it. It should therefore take the note
free of all save "real" defenses (such as forgery, fraud in factum,
insanity, etc.) against the seller. As holder in due course of the note,
in addition to obtaining a right to a money judgment on the note
against the maker, it can expect to acquire a security interest in the
property that was the subject matter of the sale. It can enforce this
interest by foreclosure, private sale, or however, in accordance with
the terms of the agreement. The fact that one is an assignee of the
security interest does not in any way affect one's status as holder in
due course of the note. Quite the reverse. Since the security interest
is security for the note, and the note is negotiable, the "security fol-
lows the debt."'1 Thus, since the finance company, as holder in due
course, holds the debt free of personal defenses, it holds the security
interest free of personal defenses. Hence, it should, as it does, win
most of its cases.
Furthermore, in most of those cases that I have found in which the
financer lost, except where the financer-seller-buyer relationship was
expressly dealt with, the decision was quite orthodox. The financer
could have expected to lose under the usual rules of negotiable instru-
ments just as, in the other cases, he could expect to be found to be a
holder in due course, and hence to win. This is seen by the holdings,
e.g., the facts justified a finding that the financer made the seller his
collection agent and hence was not a holder in due course ;22 the seller
and financer were in fact one, since they had officers in common and
20. Alabama, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota (al-
legedly applying Wisconsin law), Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico,
New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Texas.
21. Britton, Bills and Notes § 15 (1943).
22. C.I.T. v. Hurst, 23 Ala. App. 454, 176 So. 886 (1930).
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the financer took part in the sale ;23 the buyer, by showing fraud
showed that the financer's title was defective, hence the burden
shifted to him to prove he was a holder in due course ;24 the seller was
the financer's agent ;25 when one is assigned the conditional sales con-
tract as well as the note, one takes with notice that the consideration
may fail. The other cases are similar.27
These are, as indicated, the results that one would expect in this
field. There is doubtless no need to explain them since they fit into the
traditional pattern of negotiable instruments law. There is, however,
need to consider the other cases, the cases in which the financer loses
because he is the typical financer described above. How are these
cases to be explained?-s
One reason, surely, is that the whole transaction as it is normally
carried on is a sham. The transaction is really a loan by the financer
to the buyer to enable him to buy a chattel from the seller. However,
the papers are arranged in such a way that the loan is stated to be
from seller to buyer, and the resulting debt is then said to be trans-
ferred to the financer. The transaction is not, in other words, what it
appears to be. Whenever this is the case, there is always the possibil-
ity that a court can be talked into "piercing the veil," looking
"through form to substance," etc.
Probably another reason is that the way the financer, seller, and
buyer use negotiable notes is quite different from the way that the
Negotiable Instruments Law assumes that such instruments will be
23. Commercial Loan Co. v. Baker, 37 S.E.2d 636 (Ga. 1946).
24. Peoples State Bank v. Hall, 83 Ind. App. 385, 148 N.E. 486 (1925).
25. International Harvester Co. v. Watkins, 127 Kan. 50, 272 Pac. 139 (1928).
26. Sloan Lumber Co. v. Ambrose, 26 S.W.2d 348 (Tex. 1930).
27. See the following cases under the appropriate state listing in the Appen-
dix; Commercial Credit Corp. v. Freiler, 42 So. 2d 296 (La. App. 1949); G.M.A.C.
v. Daigle, 72 So. 2d 319 (La. 1954); United States v. Roberts, 115 F. Supp. 786
(E.D. Mich. 1953); First & Lumberman's Nat'l Bank v. Buchholz, 220 Minn. 97,
18 N.W.2d 771 (1945); Progressive Finance & Realty Co. v. Stempel, 231 Mo.
App. 721, 95 S.W.2d 834 (1936); Von Nordheim v. Cornelius, 129 Neb. 719, 262
N.W. 832 (1935); Veterans Loan Authority v. Rozella, 21 N.J. Super. 1, 90 A.2d
505 (1952); State Nat'l Bank v. Cantrell, 47 N.M. 389, 143 P.2d 592 (1943);
Colonial Discount Co. v. Rumens, 249 App. Div. 736, 291 N.Y. Supp. 676, aff'd, 274
N.Y. 612, 10 N.E.2d 576 (1937); C.I.T. Corp. v. Joffe, 157 Misc. 225, 283 N.Y.
Supp. 881 (1935), rev'd on other grounds, 162 Misc. 328, 293 N.Y. Supp. 659
(1937); Heiman v. Murphy, 143 Misc. 81, 256 N.Y. Supp. 20 (1932) ; Lincoln Nat'l
Bank v. Marsh, 24 N.Y.S.2d 281 (1940); Advance-Rumely Thresher Co. v. Geyer,
40 N.D. 18, 168 N.W. 731 (1918); Davis v. Commercial Credit Corp., 87 Ohio App.
311, 94 N.E.2d 710 (1950); Mercantile Trust Co. v. Roland, 143 Okla. 190, 288
Pac. 300 (1930); C.I.T. v. Wesling, 53 S.D. 337, 220 N.W. 855 (1928); General
Electric Contract Corp. v. Heimstra, 69 S.D. 78, 6 N.W.2d 445 (1942); Allied
Building Credits, Inc. v. Ellis, 258 S.W.2d 165 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953).
28. See note 14 supra.
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used. There is, and has long been, a definite policy behind the pro-
visions of the Negotiable Instruments Law that give special protec-
tion to the holder in due course of a negotiable instrument. This is
that the needs of commerce require that commercial paper be freely
transferred, and it is believed that it cannot be freely transferred un-
less one who purchases it in good faith for value acquires a good title
to the paper even though there may be defenses to it.2D And when the
law was developing, negotiable instruments were freely transferred
from hand to hand.30 It may be recalled that paper money first con-
sisted of the notes of banks.31 This expectation of free transferrabil-
ity is reflected in the Negotiable Instruments Law, the whole struc-
ture of which indicates a belief that the instruments with which it is
concerned will be negotiated or transferred, probably several times,
before being collected. 32 The other documents which have been given
29. E.g., Story, Bills of Exchange 16-17 (4th ed. 1860): "Bills of Exchange
in most, if not all, commercial countries, possess some peculiar advantages and
privileges over common contracts. Some of these privileges are connected with
the peculiar and summary remedies given to enforce the rights growing out of
them; such, for example, as exist in France and in Scotland. Others are of a
nature giving them a peculiar sanctity and obligation, and freeing them from
the equities and cross claims which may exist between the original partes. These
latter are allowed in order to give them a ready circulation, and extensive credit;
and, indeed, they seem indispensable to protect third persons, who may become
holders thereof, from injury and imposition. If, for example, the original
parties to the instrument were at liberty to set up against a bona fide holder for
a valuable consideration, without notice, any facts which might impeach its
original validity, or might show, that it had subsequently become void, or that
no consideration whatever passed between the original parties, or that the con-
sideration had since utterly failed; it is obvious, that the credit and confidence
due to the instrument would be essentially impaired, and it could not be safely
relied upon as a means of remittance of money from one country to another, or
even between different places in the same country. On the other hand, by shutting
out all such defences against such a holder, the instrument has, for many practi-
cal purposes, become an equivalent to, and a representative of, money; and it
circulates through the commercial world, as an evidence of valuable property, of
which any person, lawfully in possession, may avail himself, to make purchases,
to pay debts, and to pledge, as a security or indemnity for advances." See also
Story, Promisory Notes 13 (7th ed. 1878): "Most, if not all, commercial nations
have annexed certain privileges, benefits, and advantages to promissory notes, as
they have to bills of exchange, in order to promote public confidence in them, and
thus to insure their circulation as a medium of pecuniary commercial transac-
tions."
30. See text at note 60 infra.
31. Waterman, The Promissory Note As a Substitute for Money, 14 Minn. L.
Rev. 313, 321-30 (1930).
32. E.g., the elaborate provisions on presentment, protest, and notice of dis-
honor, Negotiable Instruments Law §§ 70-118, 143-160; further, the warranties of
drawers and endorsers which are designed to run to subsequent holders obviously
contemplate that there will be subsequent holders. Id. §§ 61, 64, 66.
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the attributes of negotiability have, by and large, been of a similar
character-it has been expected that they would be much negotiated,
for example, bills of lading, warehouse receipts, and stock certifi-
cates.'- And, as a matter of fact, they are negotiated-probably much
more than notes. This property of negotiability is still extraordinary,
however. The rules as to chattels and as to other choses in action re-
main as before. The bona fide purchaser of such an item gets what his
transferor had and no more.34
The situation contemplated by the Negotiable Instruments Law is,
thus, quite different from that of the financer, seller, and buyer as
outlined here. Far from being a stranger to the transaction, the
financer is the person to whom the obligation is intended to run, who
furnished the consideration for it, and who will normally retain the
instrument for collection. Consequently it would be possible to argue
that since the privileges that are given to holders in due course are
of a very special kind, different from those received by most trans-
ferees, and since these privileges were originally given to them to ac-
complish a particular purpose, a purpose not effected here, then there
is no reason to extend the privileges.
It is, I believe, reasoning of this sort that has led some courts to
hold that financers are not holders in due course. Of course, as one
would expect, they have not explicitly adopted this line of reasoning35
in arriving at a result in consonance with it. It is doubtless too brazen
an approach even for a court that believes it, especially if there are
any alternative ways of arriving at the same result-ways that are
both conventional and discreet. Here, clearly, there are a great many.
Two are outstanding: one can find that the instrument is non-negoti-
able or one can find that the transferee is not a holder in due course.
Or, of course, both. These are attractive alternatives because each
may be determined to be true for an almost infinite number of rea-
sons. It is a rare negotiable instruments case that will not have some
elements that can, if necessary, be twisted plausibly to permit the re-
quired finding. Both reasons have been used by the courts.
Thus, there are quite a few cases in which it is "held" that the note
is non-negotiable because it is bound up with a chattel mortgage and
the mortgage contains clauses that either make the promise to pay
conditional or the time in which it is to be performed uncertain.3 6
33. All of these instruments can be given the attributes of negotiability. Uni-
form Bills of Lading Act § 5, Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act § 5, Uniform
Stock Transfer Act §§ 1, 5, 6, 8.
34. Brown, Personal Property §§ 67-72 (2d ed. 1955).
35. Essentially, cessante ratione legis cessat et ipsa lex.
36. E.g., Old Colony Trust Co. v. Stumpel, 126 Misc. 375, 213 N.Y. Supp. 536,
aff'd, 219 App. Div. 771, 220 N.Y. Supp. 893, aff'd without opinion, 247 N.Y. 538,
161 N.E. 173 (1928). See also Annot., 44 A.L.R.2d 8, 59-63 (1955).
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This doctrine has two weaknesses, however. In the first place, there
is a very strong and ancient rule supported by the Negotiable Instru-
ments Law itself that negotiability is not affected by a mere reference
in the instrument to the security.37 Therefore, it is easy to phrase
the note in such a way that it is not "subject to" the mortgage and
hence the terms of the mortgage are irrelevant to the note. There
may be more trouble if the financer attempts to enforce the lien in-
stead of, or in addition to, suing on the note.38 Even in that situation,
however, the financer will usually prevail since, as indicated above,
the "security follows the debt," an assignment of the debt is automati-
cally an assignment of the security, and the security partakes of the
nature of the note. Thus, even though note and mortgage are printed
on the same sheet of paper, separated only by a dotted line, one who
is assigned the note is not affected by anything printed above the line
even though he is assigned that too.39 Presumably he averts his eyes.40
Even if a particular instrument is held to be negotiable, however,
it is still possible for a court to hold for the buyer by finding that the
financer is not a holder in due course. The requirements that the
financer must meet are set out in section 52 of the Negotiable Instru-
ments Law, as follows:
A holder in due course is a holder who has taken the instru-
ment under the following conditions:
1. That it is complete and regular upon its face;
2. That he became the holder of it before it was overdue, and
without notice that it had been previously dishonored, if such
was the fact;
3. That he took it in good faith and for value;
4. That at the time it was negotiated to him he had no notice
of any infirmity in the instrument or defect in the title of the
person negotiating it.
37. Negotiable Instruments Law § 5(1) (negotiability not affected by pro-
vision which authorizes sale of collateral on default). Britton, Bills & Notes § 15
(1943).
38. See, e.g., Mercantile Trust Co. v. Roland, 143 Okla. 190, 288 Pac. 300
(1930).
39. See Britton, Bills & Notes § 15 (1943).
40. See Beutel, Negotiability by Contract, 28 Ill. L. Rev. 205 (1934).
Another doctrine may be available in aid of the financer, and that is "negoti-
ability by contract." Under this theory the conditional sales contract itself (or
perhaps the chattel mortgage, though this would be unusual) can be made negoti-
able in effect. Usually this is accomplished by placing in the instrument a clause
waiving against an assignee defenses that might have been available against the
seller. This doctrine is not universally accepted by any means, but it seems to be
firmly established in some jurisdictions. See also Annot., 44 A.L.R.2d. 8, 92-96,
162-72 (1955); Note, 5 De Paul L. Rev. 149 (1955).
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Since "value" includes past consideration4 there is rarely any ques-
tion of this. Nor is there usually any question of maturity since the
notes are assigned to the finance company almost as soon as they are
signed, or in any event long before maturity. The requirement that
the instrument be complete and regular on its face will probably arise
only in rather special circumstances, as, if the note does not have a
due date and is not payable on demand. 42
The remaining requirement is quite important, however, and does
offer a chance for the court to find that the finance company is not a
holder in due course. This is the requirement of notice. Section 56
provides:
To constitute notice of an infirmity in the instrument or de-
fect in the title of the person negotiating the same, the person to
whom it is negotiated must have had actual knowledge of the in-
firmity or defect, or knowledge of such facts that his action in
taking the instrument amounted to bad faith.
In order to be charged with bad faith, the transferee must actually
know of the defect in the instrument.4 3 In the situation being dealt
with here, this defect will have something to do with the sale. The
object sold may not have been delivered or it may have proved defec-
tive, or the seller's title to it may have been defective so that it was re-
plevied from the buyer by the true owner. One may assume that all of
these assertions would, if proved, be good defenses against the seller.
If the finance company took the instrument with knowledge that they
existed, it would not be a holder in due course. In fact, however, it
is most unlikely that a financer will know anything about a particular
sale, or that it would intentionally collude with a dishonest seller.
Obviously cases exist where financers have joined in fraudulent
schemes.4 But a dishonest seller is just as likely to attempt to de-
fraud the finance company as a retail buyer. Indeed, one fairly com-
mon device of such individuals is to assign the finance company paper
that apparently arises out of sales of chattels when these sales have
never, in fact, taken place. Consequently, it is not necessary to impute
an inordinate amount of virtue to the finance company to assume that
the cases of actual knowledge of fraud will be few. Yet the statute
requires actual subjective knowledge at the time the instrument is
assigned in order to charge the assignee with bad faith. Thus, one
would expect this argument to have little success. And it does not,
41. Negotiable Instruments Law § 25.
42. See Remedial Plan v. Ott, 188 Ky. 161, 250 S.W. 825 (1923).
43. Britton, Bills & Notes §§ 100, 101 (1943).
44. Taylor v. Atlas Security Co., 213 Mo. App. 282, 249 S.W. 746 (1923) may
well be such a case. See Appendix.
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though it has more than the first arguments mentioned. There are
some cases that stretch the doctrine to include the financer.
45
How then can a court without too radically twisting the traditional
rules find for the buyer if it wishes to? The only feasible way seems
to be to start at the other end of section 52 and look into the transfer
to the financer. In form, of course, there is negotiation since there is
endorsement by the named payee and delivery.40 Obviously, however,
if an individual has an agent acquire a negotiable instrument for him,
though it is drawn to the order of the agent, still the principal is the
beneficial owner of the instrument. His position vis-a-vis the maker
is not improved or changed by his going through the form of negotia-
tion. He was the real party all along and remains so. And this is
precisely the situation of the financer. Hence it is not a holder in due
course.
This, it is believed is what, in fact, those courts do, though they
may not do so in so many words. Some, however, that have held for
the buyer do use almost this language. Thus the Arkansas court in
Commercial Credit Co. v. Childs said:
[Plaintiff] was so closely connected with the entire transaction
or with the deal that it cannot be heard to say that it, in good
faith was an innocent purchaser of the instrument for value be-
fore maturity... Rather than being a purchaser of the instru-
ment after its execution, it was to all intents and purposes a
party to the agreement.47
And the California court in Commercial Credit Corp. v. Orange
County Machine Works said:
Throughout the entire transaction, Commercial Credit dealt
chiefly with Ermac, the future payee, rather than with Machine
Works, the future maker. ... In a very real sense the finance
company was a moving force in the transaction ....- I"
Perhaps the strongest statement was by a juidge of the City Court of
Buffalo, New York. He wrote, in an opinion:
It is obvious that here we have a factual joint enterprise in
which, so far as conditional sales are concerned, the management
45. Palmer v. Associates Discount Corp., 124 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir. 1941) (the
close relationship with seller is evidence that financer had notice of defenses-
he had the burden of proving himself holder in due course); Zier v. Eastern Ac-
ceptance Corp., 61 A.2d 106 (D.C. Munic. App. 1948); Mutual Finance Co. v.
Martin, 63 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 1953); Allied Building Credits v. Mathewson, 335
Mich. 270, 55 N.W.2d 826 (1952) (semble); Taylor v. Atlas Security Co., 213
Mo. App. 282, 249 S.W. 746 (1923).
46. Negotiable Instruments Law § 30.
47. 199 Ark. 1073, 1077, 137 S.W.2d 260, 262 (1940).
48. 34 C.2d 766, 771, 214 P.2d 819, 822 (1950).
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rests in the far larger part in the hands of the finance companies.
The finance company and the merchant-seller are as a fact en-
gaged in one business, like Longfellow's description of man and
woman, useless one without the other. To pretend that they are
separate and distinct enterprises is to draw the veil of fiction
over the face of fact.49
It does seem that these courts are right insofar as they hold that a
financer should not be in any better position by going through these
motions than if it lent money direct to the buyer. But neither should
it be in any worse position. Yet, if these cases are followed to any
great extent, it will be. After all, the buyer could very easily have
borrowed the money to buy a car directly from a bank and given it
a note and chattel mortgage. If the car was defective or not delivered,
no one would suppose that these would be matters which would con-
cern the bank. The buyer signed a note to the bank's order for money
which the bank was to lend him. The bank lent him the money. It is
entitled to get it back. If the buyer spent the money foolishly or was
defrauded, that is not the bank's affair. The buyer must look else-
where for whatever relief he can get. It is difficult to see why this
should not be true of the financer in the present situation. Yet under
the decisions of the courts that have been referred to, it is not true.
When those courts look through the transaction, instead of seeing a
loan from financer to buyer, they see an identity between seller and
financer. Hence defenses that are good against the seller are good
against the buyer.
Apart from getting these courts to overrule themselves and prevent-
ing others from following them or getting helpful legislation, what
can the financers do to avoid this result?
One thing they could do is to arrange the transactions as what they
really are. In other words, they could lend money direct to the buyer
and get the security interest back. There seem to be only two sub-
stantial reasons why they should not carry on their business this way,
and they are not very convincing ones. One is that the seller fre-
quently endorses the note "with recourse." Thus if the buyer does
not pay, the seller must. But this result would be accomplished if the
seller guaranteed payment by signing as accommodation party, either
maker or endorser according to taste. Or the seller and financer could
enter into a separate guaranty agreement. The other reason is that
it is very difficult to use a conditional sales contract in this transac-
49. Buffalo Industrial Bank v. De Marzio, 162 Misc. 742, 744, 296 N.Y. Supp.
783, 785-86 (1937). The effect of such a view is not limited to this problem. An
out-of-state financer may be regarded as so closely related to the seller that he
is "doing business" in the seller's state with all that that entails. See Note,
The Effect of Qualification Statutes on Unlicensed Foreign Corporate Commercial
Finance Companies: The Doing Business Concept, 1956 Wash. U.L.Q. 450.
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tion unless it is arranged in the usual way. While the conditional sales
contract has been stretched until it is almost the exact equivalent of
the chattel mortgage-in other words a security device-it must still
arise out of a sale. The borrower must agree to buy the car, and
return it if the installment payments are not made, and this agreement
must run to the actual seller. However, it is difficult to see what ad-
vantages there really are to conditional sales contracts nowadays.
Traditionally they did not have to be recorded if there was a default
in payment; there was a total forfeiture of payments already made;
and it was easy to disguise a usurious rate of interest in a "time"
price that would be more than a "cash" price-the difference by some
legerdemain has never (or rarely) been regarded as interest. (Why,
it is difficult to imagine.) Presently, however, in most states, condi-
tional sales contracts do have to be recorded to be valid against bona
fide purchasers.50 Furthermore, there are, in many states, statutes
requiring that any surplus that results from a sale of a repossessed
article must be paid over to the buyer." In any event, in most cases
there will be no surplus. The effort is almost always to collect a de-
ficiency judgment for the amount still due on the note after the col-
lateral is sold. Usury is perhaps important. It seems quite likely that
most consumer installment loans are made for rates that are, in fact,
in excess of the statutory rates. This is usually accomplished by set-
ting a different price for a sale for cash and a sale on "time." Since
parties are free to agree to whatever price they choose, this difference
is not interest but the additional price the buyer pays for not paying
cash.52 Financers might very well have a lot of trouble getting courts
to uphold similar arrangements if the loans were made direct. 3 It is
difficult to disguise interest as a service charge if all that the borrower
gets is money. It is perhaps needless to comment on this aspect of the
problem.5
50. The development of the conditional sales contract as a security device and
its present use and misuse are discussed in some detail in Gilmore & Axelrod,
Chattel Security: I, 57 Yale L.J. 517, 541-48 (1948).
51. E.g., Uniform Conditional Sales Act § 18 (permitting redemption after
retaking by the seller) ; § 21 (surplus proceeds of sale to be repaid to buyer).
52. 6 Corbin, Contracts § 1500 (1951); Comment, Usury in Installment Selling,
9 Ala. L. Rev. 319 (1957).
53. 6 Corbin, Contracts § 1500 (1951).
54. Of course there are many valid arguments that can be made against the
usury statutes. But I wonder if it is a good idea for courts to substitute so
readily their ideas about the wisdom of having a maximum rate of interest for
the clearly expressed intention of the legislature. There is surely something to
be said for making the interested parties get the legTslature to change the law.
Banks, finance companies, et al., are not, after all, without resources. The Arkan-
sas Supreme Court has had the unusual tendency of seeing interest rather than
service charges in this situation, though it is dealing with a constitutional pro-
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Even if all this is admitted, however, it may well be asked what
possible difference it all makes. Even though there are adverse cases
and the results could be avoided with relatively little trouble, financers
are clearly making a great deal of money the way things are.55 If
there are a few cases-even quite a few-against them, they can
predict approximately what the adverse decisions will cost them and
charge this off as a business expense. Perhaps they can raise their
rates a few decimal points to compensate. There are not so many
defaulting sellers or stubborn buyers as to create a great problem.
In answer one can only say that in the first place the problem is one
that does arise from time to time in the courts. Consequently, lawyers
have to find cases and arguments on both sides of the question. It is
hoped that this article may be of some aid in such endeavors. That
is one of its purposes. However, it is not the only purpose. It is be-
lieved that these cases point up a problem in the law of negotiable
instruments that has been developing for generations and that has
received almost no consideration. That is, the case of the negotiable
instrument which is never negotiated. The reverse problem-the non-
negotiable instrument which is negotiated-has received a great deal
of attention. So, in the Uniform Commercial Code, article 5 deals with
documents of title to goods and provides that they may be negotiable,
and article 8 does the same for investment securities although the
documents so treated are not "negotiable instruments" in the tradi-
tional sense. Article 3, however, which deals with roughly the same
subject matter as the Negotiable Instruments Law, except as particu-
lar instruments may be treated in other articles, is in most respects
quite similar to the statute it replaces. The changes are in detail-as
opposed, say, to article 2 on sales, or article 9 on secured transactions,
where the whole approach of the law is changed. But, as indicated
above, the notes that are involved in installment sales are not often
negotiated in the sense of being passed from hand to hand. And the
hibition. See Sloan v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 308 S.W.2d 802 (Ark. 1957). This
case has induced a state of mild frenzy in the finance companies. See Higgins,
Arkansas Supreme Court Rejects Rule That a Time Sale is not a Loan, 12
Personal Finance L.Q. Rep. 66 (1958).
55. Commercial Credit Corporation had a net income in 1957 of $26,777,876, or
$5.31 per share of an equity value of $41.47. 2 Standard & Poor's, Standard
Corporation Descriptions 3947 (1958). C.I.T. had a net income in 1957 of
$39,092,388, or $4.27 per share (9,157,141 no par shares carried at $56,774,274) ;
GMAC had $46,037,000 ($50,000,000 4% par $100 preferred shares, $100,000,000
par $100 common). $22,000,000 was paid in dividends. The earned surplus on 31
December 1957 was $123,831,963 (up approximately $24,000,000 from the pre-
ceding year). The total volume of business for GMAC was $9,808,394,000; for
C.I.T. $5,257,949,468. The bulk of their operating capital comes of course from
long and short term loans. The figures for C.I.T. are from Moody's, Banks and
Finance 1277 (1958); for GMAC, id. at 1316.
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same is true of many other negotiable instruments, notably checks,
most of which go from payee to bank and thereafter remain in bank-
ing channels. 8
This fact should, I believe, be considered by all who are interested
in commercial law, and for that matter in "law." This is because the
Negotiable Instruments Law is applied to many situations with which
it was not designed to deal. It can be so applied only by resort to
what is, in effect, a legal fiction. While legal fictions serve a useful,
and doubtless essential, function in law,57 their use can be quite dan-
gerous. Laymen almost always regard them with suspicion, hatred or
contempt. If a layman loses a lawsuit solely, as he thinks, because of
lawyers' hocus pocus, he will be, at the least, annoyed, perhaps en-
raged. He will blame the law and feel that it does not do justice. This
attitude is, I think, bad.5 8 Furthermore an overuse of legal fictions
56. In a way, perhaps, checks are a bad example since their collection is
governed by special law, such as the Bank Collection Code and article 4 of the
Uniform Commercial Code. Still these statutes do not deal with the problem of
negotiability. They simply recognize, implicitly, that "negotiation" has little to do
with the problems that banks have with checks-their basic problem being to
throw any loss that may occur in collection onto some solvent person in the
collection chain. In England the problem has come more out into the open.
Checks need no longer be endorsed if they are deposited in the payee's bank for
collection. Cheques Act, 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 36.
57. See Maine, Ancient Law 13-25 (Everyman ed. 1954).
58. This specific problem has, as a matter of fact, received a scathing comment
in a national magazine, and this, needless to say, is not the fate of most prob-
lems in the law of bills and notes. (Most such problems do not receive much
attention even in law reviews.) See Brecher, Ballard v. The Installment Goliaths,
Harpers' Magazine, Sept., 1956, p. 63. The comments of the authors on the
procedure described here are an interesting example of laymen's attitudes. They
write:
"It may seem obvious to you that the bank or finance company has lent you
the money to pay for the car-but don't jump to any such conclusion. The ap-
parent lender insists that he really hasn't lent anything at all; he has merely
'purchased' the conditional sales contract or CSC from the dealer (not the bor-
rower) at a 'discount.'
"Why do dealers and lenders bother to dance this legal minuet? Two answers
suggest themselves. First,... the lender usually escapes the usury prohibitions.
"The second obvious reason for dancing the CSC minuet is to make available
certain highly convenient methods of collection and repossession.
"Maybe justice really isn't fo' po' folks," one of the lawyers remarks in his
quiet Alabama drawl.
"Here and there across the country, a few other courts in little-publicized cases
have been willing to take off their blinders and to look through the CSC 'paper
bag' to the usurious contents of the bag."
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prevents an intelligent analysis of a problem because the problem
tends not to be approached as what most people, even lawyers, think it
is, but rather as something that it is not, although it bears the name.
As long as it is clear to everyone that the fiction is simply an empty
ritual, doubtless no harm is done. But if the fiction is confused with
fact-and this I believe is the case here-good results in cases will be
accidental. Thus it did no harm to presume that all contracts brought
before the court of King's Bench were made "in the parish of St.
Mary-le-Bow in the ward of Cheap" even though in fact a contract
might have been made in Leghorn, since this assumption gave the
court jurisdiction and it was always regarded as a fiction.59 If, how-
ever, the court would have refused to let the plaintiff introduce evi-
dence regarding transactions that took place in Leghorn because he
had pleaded that the contract was made in London, the results would
have been chaotic. This, it seems to me, is about what has happened
in negotiable instruments law.
Perhaps this argument will be made clearer by a brief examination
of the history of negotiable instruments in the common law. 0 It may
be recalled that there were negotiable instruments and a law (or
custom)-the law merchant-regarding them before they appeared
in the common law courts. 1 At the time (the 17th century), the com-
The particular incident that sparked the article was the repossession of a truck,
after default in payments under a note and conditional sales contract which had
been assigned to a financer. There was the usual usurious interest rate disguised
as a difference between the cash price and the time price. Usury was raised as
a defense in the repossession (detinue) action in the state court. Ballard v. First
Nat'l Bank, 261 Ala. 594, 75 So. 2d 484 (1954). Then some other truckers in
the same situation as Mr. Ballard brought an action against the financer, a
national bank, for recovery of double the amount of usurious interest paid
under 13 Stat. 108 (1864), 12 U.S.C. §§ 85, 86 (1952). Providing for such an
action the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit decided that the time price
-- cash price differential was usury. Daniel v. First Nat'l Bank, 227 F.2d 353,
rehearing denied, 228 F.2d 803 (5th Cir. 1956).
59. Otherwise the common law courts did not have jurisdiction over contracts
that were made and designed to be performed abroad. Actually the plaintiff
averred that Leghorn was in the parish of St. Mary-le-Bow, etc. 5 Holdsworth,
History of English Law 140-42 (2d ed. 1937).
60. This history is generally examined in 1 Holdsworth, History of English
Law 571-72 (7th ed. 1956); 5 id. 151-77 (1926). See also Holden, History of Ne-
gotiable Instruments in English Law (1955), especially 21-143.
61. Pace Dr. Holden, op. cit. supra note 60, at 4-13, it seems to me that the
important aspect of the history is that there were instruments that performed
most of the functions of negotiable instruments in use in England centuries
before the development of negotiable instruments law in the common law courts.
Indeed, in the medieval period obligations could be represented by notched sticks
of wood, called tallies, that could be transferred. Salzman, English Trade in the
Middle Ages 25-28 (1931). See also Postan, Private Financial Instruments in
Medieval England, 23 Vierteljahrschrift fir Sozial-und Wirtschafts-Geschichte
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mon law courts did not recognize the rights of the assignee of choses
in action, and of course they did not (as they do not) recognize the
right of a bona fide purchaser to cut off legal interests. Both of these
doctrines-free assignability, and the cutting off of defenses by a good
faith purchase-were recognized by the law merchant in connection
with negotiable instruments. Further, it was (and is) possible to
have an enforceable right under a negotiable instrument that was not
supported by consideration as that concept was applied in the case of
other choses in action.62 When the common law courts began to enter-
tain actions on negotiable instruments, they did not change the law of
contracts (or more accurately, perhaps, the law of assumpsit) to con-
form with the law of negotiable instruments. Rather, they enforced
negotiable instruments as they thought the merchants enforced them
(with a little backing and filling to be sure). The plaintiff did not
declare on the promise, express or implied, as in the normal contract
action of assumpsit. He declared on the custom of merchants. Origi-
nally, indeed, it was necessary that he be a merchant. Negotiable
instruments were treated in a special way, and, naturally enough, only
those instruments that clearly were of the type that merchants used
were treated as merchants would treat them. Or, in other words, only
such instruments had the law merchant rather than the common
law of contracts applied to them. The law merchant became, of
course, a part of the common law but that part of it that related to
negotiable instruments did not become a part of the law of contracts.
It remained separate. And it did not apply to all obligations to
pay money but only to those that were regarded as legitimate descen-
dants of the mercantile instruments that were its original subject-
bills and notes. Obviously then, when the cases were codified this
aspect was codified as well, and section 1 of the Negotiable Instru-
ments Law and section 3-104 of the Uniform Commercial Code pro-
vide descriptions or definitions of the instruments to which the
statutes apply. Only instruments meeting the standards there set
forth are negotiable and acquire the legal characteristics that the acts
give such instruments. These include free assignability (no longer
too important since most choses in action are freely assignable) and
freedom from defenses.
So far the development seems sound and unexceptionable. The
original policies have been retained and are still relevant. Clearly
26 (1930). Thus the mercantile community was quite used to having symbols
other than "money" by means of which credit could be transferred.
62. It is perhaps enough to mention the problem of the liabilities of the maker
of an order instrument which is endorsed in blank by the payee, stolen from
the payee's transferee, and finally sold by the thief to one who becomes a holder
in due course and hence is able to hold the maker liable.
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there are still many bills and notes that are handled in almost the
same way as their predecessors two centuries ago. And doubtless
there are reasons for distinguishing them from other choses in action.
Here lies the difficulty, however. Legal definitions have two tenden-
cies. They exclude things that do not come within them. So here, no
instrument that fails to fit the standard is covered by the statute. But
they include anything which does come within the terms and treat
it as the law provides that things so defined should be treated.
Thus any obligation or chose in action which fits the definition of a
negotiable instrument is a "negotiable instrument" with all its prop-
erties. This will be true even though it is not at all the sort of thing
that is passed from hand to hand in normal commercial intercourse
and hence is expected by the merchants into whose hands it comes to
have the attributes of negotiability. Thus the consumer installment
notes are negotiable though locked in a vault from signing to payment.
The problem arises from the definition which refers only to the
surface characteristics (unconditional promise to pay money in writ-
ing, etc.) and not to the essential nature of the thing defined. It is
as though an Englishman were defined as a man of above average
height with a ruddy complexion, fair, but not overly fair hair, bad
teeth, and a tendency to stammer and say "By Jove." Then any man
who was above average height, etc., would be an Englishman. So
here, a law was developed to apply to certain types of obligations
which perform the function of enabling credit to be transferred easily.
Such obligations were called negotiable instruments and some of their
characteristics were described in a statute. There are other instru-
ments which are given those described characteristics but which do
not perform the functions of the original obligations at all. They are
made to look like those obligations only to acquire the special rights
that the statute gives them. And the courts say the statute does gives
them these rights.
This problem of definitions is a common and doubtless unavoidable
one, since it is impossible to frame a definition of manageable size
that includes every attribute of the thing defined. In this area it has
resulted in a complete reversal of the policy of the'statute and the
cases that preceded it. The limitation has resulted in an extension.
But it is an unnecessary extension. Merely because lawyers have
called a loan that is in fact from A to B, a loan from C to B that is
assigned to A, does not mean that courts must agree. They need not,
in consequence, say that since the loan is represented by a negotiable
instrument no defense that is available between C and B is available
against A. Or, disliking the result say, but perhaps this instrument
is not negotiable because it refers to the instrument (such as a
chattel mortgage) which secures its payment. Then, later if an in-
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strument which is negotiated freely like a bond comes before the
court, the former decision will perhaps require the result that the
bond which is in fact negotiated from coast to coast, is not negotiable.
All of this is, I believe, as indicated above, the result of the use of
legal fictions, the fiction being that an instrument, which is not in
fact negotiable since it is not and is not intended to be negotiated, is
said to be negotiable because in some respects it looks like instru-
ments that are negotiable. Then decisions involving the two types of
instrument will be digested, and hence cited, under the same heading
-the result is chaos. But a court could say that this definition is not
exhaustive. It expresses some characteristics of negotiability but not
all. This instrument is outside the act despite its form.
If courts will not do this, then surely it is the task of legislation.
The problem is not limited to the fact situation considered here. Other
types of so-called negotiable instruments are also not negotiated.
What the solution should be I cannot now suggest. Doubtless it would
not be simple. The official complete edition of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code covers 711 pages. But before there can be solutions there
must be a recognition of the problems. It is hoped that this article
has shown one of them.
APPENDIX
As indicated in note 14, all of the cases that I have found that I
regard as fairly relevant are collected here and grouped by states. A
caveat should be entered. This collection of cases does not purport to
be an accurate summary of the ease law that pertains to this subject.
There are two reasons for this. The first is that is is extremely diffi-
cult to make sure that one has got all the relevant cases in any field,
even for one not very litigious state. It is very nearly impossible to
do so for the country as a whole. The problem is complicated by the
fact that the effort has been to find cases with the typical fact situa-
tion regardless of what rules of law were applied. In the second place
this article deals with a specialized aspect of a much litigated problem
-whether a particular holder is a holder in due course. The larger
problem is not restricted to installment sales and all of the cases that
do deal with such sales are decided within the larger context. Con-
sequently one cannot really make too accurate a statement about the
law in, say California, unless, in addition to the cases cited here, one
is also familiar with all of the other cases that the California courts
have decided on what constitutes notice, usual course of business, good
faith, and the like.
No effort has been made to present a unified and coherent picture
of the "law" of any state since it is believed that any order that might
thereby be achieved would be entirely factitious. Almost any one of
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these cases could have been decided the other way by the same court.
The Uniform Commercial Code is not discussed since there is ap-
parently only one provision that particularly affects this problem.
This is section 9-206, which provides that in the case of consumer
sales the financer is subject to defenses good against the seller if he
attempts to assert his security interest in the goods.
It should be assumed that the facts in the cases cited are roughily
the same as those indicated in the text at note 3 unless otherwise
indicated.
Alabama:
In general the Alabama courts appear to have regarded the financer
as a holder in due course and as not subject to any defenses that
might have been available against the seller. The typical fact situa-
tion is set out in some detail in Singer v. Nat'l Bond & Inv. Co., 218
Ala. 375, 118 So. 561 (1928), where the financer won despite various
defenses. In that case, the note and chattel mortgage forms were
prepared by the financer and, as printed, they were made payable at
its office. There was a previous case arriving at the same result in
connection with a defense of usury, Commercial Credit Co. v. Parks,
215 Ala. 648, 112 So. 237 (1927). And similar results have been
reached subsequently. Royal Tire Service, Inc. v. Shade Valley Boys'
Club, 232 Ala. 357, 168 So. 139 (1936) (rather special facts which
tend to throw suspicion on the good faith of the financer's acquisi-
tion) ; Commercial Credit Co. v. Seale, 30 Ala. App. 440, 8 So. 2d 199
(1942) (apparently the conditional sales contract was held to be ne-
gotiable in itself) ; Cotton v. John Deere Plow Co., 246 Ala. 36, 18 So.
2d 727 (1944). However, in C.I.T. v. Hurst Bros., 23 Ala. App. 454,
126 So. 886 (1930), the buyer was able to prevail in his claim in
breach of warranty against the financer. The seller had told the
buyer that it was turning the paper over to the financer for collection.
The paper was made payable at the plaintiff's place of business in
New York. The buyer wrote to the financer and asked if he might
pay the financer. Plaintiff replied he could. It had these papers
for collection. The court held that these facts justified a finding
that the plaintiff was a collection agent of the seller and not a holder
in due course. The case has never been cited since, according to
Shepherd's, except in the A.L.R. annotations. In Daniel v. First Nat'l
Bank, 228 F.2d 803 (5th Cir. 1956) the court indicated that this type
of transaction might well be regarded as a loan from financer to
buyer, although there were other factors which led them to hold for
the buyer. The financer also won in Ballard v. First Nat'l Bank, 261
Ala. 594, 75 So. 2d 484 (1954). See note 58 supra.
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Arizona:
In the only case that has been found with the typical fact situation,
the financer won. However, there was no discussion of any problems
peculiar to financers. Rugee v. Hadley Products, Inc., 73 Ariz. 362,
241 P.2d 798 (1952). In a similar situation, involving a corporation
organized to make loans to distressed cattle owners through local
banks, the financer won. The court refused to hold that the financer
was the real mortgagee. Stock Growers Finance Corp. v. Hildreth,
30 Ariz. 505, 249, Pac. 71 (1926).
Arkansas:
Commercial Credit Co. v. Childs, 199 Ark. 1073, 137 S.W.2d 260
(1940) is usually cited as one of the leading cases for the proposition
that the financer is not a holder in due course. It has never been over-
ruled nor did it purport to overrule any previous decisions. However,
there were previous decisions in favor of financers. See, e.g., Davis
& Worrell v. G.M.A.C., 153 Ark. 626, 241 S.W. 44 (1922) ; Trice v.
People's Loan & Inv. Co., 173 Ark. 1160, 293 S.W. 1037 (1927);
McClain v. Patterson, 177 Ark. 544, 7 S.W.2d 8 (1928); General
Contract Purchase Corp. v. Holland, 196 Ark. 675, 119 S.W.2d
535 (1938). The result of the Childs case has been reached in
subsequent Arkansas cases, e.g., Bastian-Blessing Co. v. Stroope,
203 Ark. 116, 155 S.W.2d 892 (1941) (citing Childs case); Gale
& Co. v. Wallace, 210 Ark. 161, 194 S.W.2d 881 (1946); Schuck
v. Murdock Acceptance Corp., 220 Ark. 56, 247 S.W.2d 1 (1952).
However, the financer has also won in some cases subsequent to the
Childs case on facts which are very similar, although that case and
the issues raised there were not discussed. See Garst v. General Con-
tract Purchase Corp., 211 Ark. 526, 201 S.W.2d 757 (1947) (princi-
pal issue was usury) ; Public Loan Corp. v. Terrell, 224 Ark. 616, 275
S.W.2d 435 (1955) (the buyer did not file a brief; the Childs case was
not cited).
California:
Commercial Credit Corp. v. Orange County Machine Works, 34
C.2d 766, 214 P.2d 819 (1950) is another leading case against the
financers' holder-in-due-course status. There appears to be little other
California law on the point although a later federal case seems to re-
affirm this view. United States v. Klatt, 135 F. Supp. 648 (S.D. Cal.
1955) (alternative holding). There is an earlier appeals case which
affirmed a judgment for the financer. People's Bank v. Porter, 58 Cal.
App. 41, 208 Pac. 200 (1922). This case was cited in the decision by
the court of appeal for the financer in Commercial Credit Corp. v.
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Orange County Machine Works, 208 P.2d 780 (Cal. App. 1949). It
was not, however, cited by the supreme court in its decision in the
same case (cited above) for the buyer.
Colorado:
I have found no cases in Colorado.
Connecticut:
I have found no cases in Connecticut.
Delaware:
In Continental Guaranty Corp. v. Peoples' Bus Line, 31 Del. 595,
117 Atl. 275 (1922), there was a decision for the financer. However,
it was simply assumed that if the note was negotiable, the financer
was a holder in due course.
District of Columbia:
One case in the District contains language that would seem to in-
dicate that the typical fact situation set out above is in and of itself
evidence, though not conclusive evidence, that the financer is not a
holder in due course. Palmer v. Associates Discount Corp., 124 F.2d
225 (D.C. Cir. 1941). This position receives some support in Zier v.
Eastern Acceptance Corp., 61 A.2d 106 (D.C. Munic. App. 1948) in
which a directed verdict for the financer was reversed. The financer
had the burden, under the facts, of showing himself a holder in due
course; the fact that the note was on a form furnished by the financer
and payable at his office was not determinative but might show mala
fides. However, subsequent cases have held for the financer consis-
tently and although the facts in the cases were "distinguishable" from
those in the Palmer case, (what case cannot be distinguished?) and
were "distinguished" by the courts, the atmosphere in the Municipal
Court of Appeals, as opposed to the United States Court of Appeals,
is apparently favorable to financers. See Wilson v. Gorden, 91 A.2d
329 (D.C. Munic. App. 1952) ; McDonald v. Stone, 86 A.2d 624 (D.C.
Munic. App. 1952) ; Fabrizio v. Anderson, 62 A.2d 314 (D.C. Munic.
App. 1948) ; Eastern Acceptance Corp. v. Henry, 62 A.2d 309 (D.C.
Munic. App. 1948).
Florida:
Mutual Finance Co. v. Martin, 63 So. 2d 649, 44 A.L.R.2d I (Fla.
1953) is one of the leading cases for the proposition that the closeness
of relationship between financer and the transaction between buyer
and seller is sufficient to prevent it from being a holder in due course
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and indeed the court's language is very strong. There is some indi-
cation that an officer of the seller had stock in the financer, but this
fact (if it was a fact) is not dwelt upon. The court expressly limits its
holding to the proposition that "under the facts shown in this record
the finance company had.., notice of the note's infirmity .... " Id. at
653, 44 A.L.R. at 7. The Martin case was distinguished, however, in
Citizens & Southern Nat'l Bank v. Stepp, 126 F. Supp. 744 (N.D. Fla.
1954). The district judge stated that in the Martin case the name of
the financer appeared on the note and contract as the only person to
whom they could be assigned. In addition, the seller was a stock-
holder of the finance company and the finance company participated
in the sale. None of these conditions was present in the instant case.
Georgia:
The position of the finance company as distinguished from other
putative holders in due course does not appear to have been consid-
ered. However, financers recovered as holders in due course; see Peo-
ples Loan & Finance Corp. v. Latimer, 183 Ga. 809, 189 S.E. 899
(1937) ; Southern Security Co. v. American Discount Co., 184 Ga. 82,
190 S.E. 350 (1937) ; Sterling Discount Corp. v. Hooks, 56 Ga. App.
541, 193 S.E. 182 (1937) ; Peoples Loan & Finance Co. v. Ledbetter,
69 Ga. App. 729, 26 S.E.2d 671 (1943). See also Howard 'v. Trusco
Finance Co., 87 Ga. App. 509, 74 S.E.2d 379 (1953) (dictum). On
the other hand, the buyer recovered for conversion against the fi-
nancer who had replevied the car in Commercial Auto Loan Co.
v. Baker, 73 Ga. App. 534, 37 S.E.2d 636 (1946) because, inter alia,
there was evidence from which a jury could find no real third party
in the case. The financer was apparently much more involved in the
transaction than is usual: it had an officer in common with the seller
and there were extended negotiations among seller, financer and
buyer on the terms of the loan; an officer of the financer apparently
filled out the note form contrary, it was asserted, to the plaintiff's
instructions. The opinion is quite confused but apparently the court
felt that there was fraud in the inception of the agreement to which
the financer was a party and hence it could not be a bona fide pur-
chaser. The case was cited later in Howard v. Trusco Finance Co.,
supra, for the proposition that "where a conditional-sale contract is
filled in contrary to the direction of the maker and to his injury, with
full knowledge on the part of the transferee of these facts, such in-
strument is void as to him." 87 Ga. App. at 513, 74 S.W.2d at 382.
Perhaps this is what the court held. However, the financer was clearly
trying to be a holder in due course of a note and if the breach of trust
had been committed by the seller, the financer could, if a holder in
due course, have enforced the instrument according to its tenor
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against the buyer, even though he later found out about the fraud.
Negotiable Instruments Law § 14. In sum, it is difficult to know
what this case holds. It could be twisted into a holding against the
finance company.
Idaho:
In G.M.A.C. v. Garrard, 41 Idaho 151, 238 Pac. 524 (1925), the
buyer won because the tearing of the note from the contract consti-
tutes a material alteration of the note. In United States v. Troy-
Parisian, 115 F.2d 224 (9th Cir. 1940) financer recovered; however,
the conditional sales contract contained a clause waiving defenses
against assignees and this was held valid. So, although the financer
asserted that it was a holder in due course, this argument was not
considered by the court.
Illinois:
One should note first that Illinois has a statute that makes notes
secured by chattel mortgages subject to any defenses that might be
available against the mortgagee even though the note comes into the
hands of a holder in due course. Ill. Rev. Stat. c. 95, § 26 (1933).
Doubtless the chief effect of this statute is to discourage the use of
chattel mortgages and to encourage the use of conditional sales con-
tracts since they are not subject to the same regulations. See Warren,
Tools of Chattel Security Transactions in Illinois, 1957 Ill. L. Forum
531, 544. Especially, perhaps, because Illinois recognizes as valid a
clause in the conditional sales contract that waives against assignees
of the contract defenses that might be good against the seller. Com-
mercial Credit Corp. v. Biagi, 11 Ill. App. 2d 80, 136 N.E.2d 580
(1956). Otherwise, there does not seem to have been any considera-
tion by the Illinois courts of the special problem of the financer as
holder in due course. In the few cases I have found, the fmancer won.
Abingdon Bank & Trust Co. v. Shipplett-Moloney Co., 316 Ill. App.
79, 43 N.E.2d 857 (1942); Woodlawn Security Finance Corp. v.
Doyle, 252 Ill. App. 68 (1929) ; National Bond & Inv. Co. v. Lanners,
253 Ill. App. 262 (1928) ; see also Anderson Nat'l Bank v. Jacobson,
305 Ill. App. 169, 27 N.E.2d 296 (1940) (rather special facts-the
sale was of a horse and there were several renewals of the notes in-
volved).
Indiana:
There are two cases, both involving the same financer, in which the
buyer alleged that the financer was in the habit of buying the paper of
a particular dealer-indeed, it was apparently the manufacturer of
the items sold (oil burners). However, the chief argument seems to
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have centered around the question of whether the financer knew of
the defects in the equipment at the time it bought the notes. In both
cases the financer won. Berry v. Brandt C. Downey Co., 89 Ind. App.
545, 167 N.E. 136 (1929) ; Dorbecker v. Brandt C. Downey Co., 88
Ind. App. 557, 163 N.E. 535 (1928). In one somewhat earlier case
the financer lost, Peoples State Bank v. Hall, 83 Ind. App. 385, 148
N.E. 486 (1925). However, it lost only because the buyer averred
that the seller's title to the note was "defective" because of fraud
(Negotiable Instruments Law § 55) and hence the burden shifted to
the financer to show that he was a holder in due course (Negotiable
Instruments Law § 59) and he failed to satisfy this burden.
Iowa:
In Associates Discount Corp. v. Goetzinger, 245 Iowa 326, 62
N.W.2d 191 (1954) the financer lost on the ground that the seller was
acting as its agent in procuring loans. It may well be that there was
no closer relationship here than is usual between seller and financer.
Doubtless the seller usually tries to talk the buyer into financing the
sale through a particular financer. See also Andrew v. Kolsrud, 218
Iowa 15, 253 N.W. 913 (1934), where the buyer won on the same
theory-he had paid the seller.
Kansas:
There is a decision in favor of the financer, Atlas Acceptance Corp.
v. Spurgeon, 154 Kan. 290, 118 P.2d 535 (1941). However, no par-
ticular notice was taken of the peculiar status of the financer. Stevens
v. Vermillion, 109 Kan. 504, 200 Pac. 277 (1921) is frequently cited
for the financer, but there the court held there was no evidence of the
asserted defense to the note. Hence there was no need to consider
the holder in due course argument. There is also the rather special
case of Western Electric Co. v. Uhlrig, 127 Kan. 261, 273 Pac. 417
(1929) where the seller was the financer's sales agent. The notes
were given with an order of equipment to be supplied by the financer.
The defense was that the equipment was never supplied-the buyer
won. The buyer also won in International Harvester Co. v. Watkins,
127 Kan. 50, 272 Pac. 139 (1928) where (the facts are unclear) the
financer lost because (1) the note was non-negotiable and (2) the
seller was its agent. The financer was the manufacturer and its rep-
resentatives were present in the room when the papers were signed.
Indeed, they participated in preparing the papers. The financer won
in Advance-Rumely Thresher Co. v. West, 108 Kan. 875, 196 Pac.
1061 (1921) on facts almost identical to those in Advance-Rumely
Thresher Co. v. Geyer, 40 N.D. 18, 168 N.W. 731 (1918) in which the
buyer won.
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Kentucky:
I have found no really relevant cases in Kentucky. In Remedial
Plan v. Ott, 199 Ky. 161, 250 S.W. 825 (1923) the buyer won. How-
ever, it was held that the note was not complete and regular on its
face since it did not have a due date and it was not payable on de-
mand. See also Interstate Acceptance Corp. v. Humphress, 309 Ky.
614, 218 S.W.2d 663 (1949) where a judgment for the buyer was
reversed on the ground that there was evidence that financer was a
holder in due course to go to the jury. There are a number of un-
usual facts, mostly arising out of the fact that the financer was floor
planning the seller and this car was included in his lien.
Louisiana:
The situation in Louisiana is somewhat confused. There is an early
supreme court case for the financer, A. Marx & Sons v. N. Frey, Ltd.,
137 La. 948, 69 So. 757 (1915). There are a number of subsequent
courts of appeal decisions to the same effect: Finance Security Co. v.
Stuart, 75 So. 2d 353 (La. App. 1954) ; Super-Cold Southwest Co. v.
Prunty, 50 So. 2d 665 (La. App. 1951), aff'd, 220 La. 1053, 58 So. 2d
336 (1952) ; White System, Inc. v. Hall, 45 So. 2d 649 (La. App.
1950); G.M.A.C. v. Swain, 176 So. 636 (La. App. 1937) (though
here the defense was usury to which it was said the financer was sub-
ject; however, there was no usury present) ; G.M.A.C. v. Schoneke, 19
La. App. 593, 140 So. 111 (1932) ; General Contract Purchase Corp.
v. Dillnian, 18 La. App. 286, 137 So. 654 (1931) (though here the
buyer lost at the trial level and then abandoned his appeal) ; Maloney
v. Central Finance Co., 18 La. App. 108, 137 So. 353 (1931). How-
ever, there are also cases for the buyer. So, in Stevens v. Gaude, 9
La. App. 664, 120 So. 79 (1928) the court said that the sale of the
note from seller to financer was a sham. See also C.I.T. v. Emmons,
197 So. 662 (La. App. 1940) (the item purchased was destroyed by
fire; the buyer claimed the financer should have provided insurance,
since an amount for insurance was included in the finance charge) ;
International Harvester Co. v. Carruth, 23 So. 2d 473 (La. App.
1945) (seller considered financer's agent; financer manufacturer of
items sold) ; Citizens Loan Corp. v. Robbins, 40 So. 2d 503 (La. App.
1949) (financer was the manufacturer of the goods); Commercial
Credit Corp. v. Freiler, 42 So. 2d 296 (La. App. 1949) (note not com-
plete and regular on its face since not completely filled in when re-
ceived by financer) ; G.M.A.C. v. Daigle, 225 La. 123, 72 So. 2d 319
(1954) (defense was that car sold as new was used, the prior owner's
purchase of the car was financed by financer). All the cases that hold
for the financer have rather special facts except International Har-
vester Co. v. Carruth and Citizens Loan Corp v. Robbins. The latter
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case was expressly disapproved in White System, Inc. v. Hall. How-
ever, both decisions were by courts of appeal (and not the supreme
court) though of different circuits.
Maine:
I have found no cases in Maine.
Maryland:
In Home Credit Co. v. Fouch, 155 Md. 384, 142 Atl. 515 (1928) a
new trial was awarded after a judgment for the buyer. There was a
question about the financer's relation to the seller, although it was
stated that knowledge of an executory contract would not prevent one
from being a holder in due course. See also United States v. Schaef-
fer, 33 F. Supp. 547 (D. Md. 1940) where the financer was the manu-
facturer. The court felt that the transfer of the paper from seller to
financer was ineffective to cut off defenses, but there was a question
if there were any defenses. In Cooke v. Real Estate Trust Co., 180
Md. 133, 22 A. 2d 554 (1941) the financer lost because, since it took
assignment of both note and contract, it must look to the contract for
its remedies. Here, the remedy, if the item sold (an oil burner) did
not work, was to remove it. However, the situation in Maryland today
is evidently governed to a large extent by a statute, Md. Ann. Code
Gen. Laws art. 83, § 134 (1951), which provides that a note given as
part of an installment agreement shall refer to the agreement and
shall "in the hands of any subsequent holder" be subject to all de-
fenses of the buyer except that acknowledgment of delivery by the
buyer shall be conclusive to an assignee of the note without knowledge.
This has been held to apply to holders in due course, Griffin v. Balti-
more Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n, 204 Md. 154, 102 A.2d 804 (1954).
Massachusetts:
The financers won in the only relevant cases I have found: Com-
mercial Credit Co. v. M. MeDonough Co., 238 Mass. 73, 130 N.E. 179
(1921) ; Standard Acceptance Corp. v. Chapin, 277 Mass. 278, 178
N.E. 538 (1931). No consideration was given to the financer-seller
question.
Michigan:
The earlier Michigan cases seem to hold for the financer consis-
tently. In the earliest case I have found the trial court found for the
buyer on the ground that the financer was estopped to deny that the
seller was its agent, but this decision was reversed on appeal. Re-
public Mortgage Co. v. Johnson, 221 Mich. 97, 190 N.W. 628 (1922).
Otherwise the financer won. Muskegon Citizens Loan & Inv. Co. v.
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Champayne, 257 Mich. 427, 241 N.W. 135 (1932) ; Northwestern Fi-
nance Co. v. Crouch, 258 Mich. 411, 242 N.W. 771 (1932); Manu-
facturers' Finance Corp. v. Estate of Andary, 269 Mich. 1, 256 N.W.
601 (1934) ; United States v. O'Hara, 46 F. Supp. 780 (E.D. Mich.
1942) ; Hardy v. C.I.T., 308 Mich. 256, 13 N.W.2d 281 (1944). How-
ever, in Allied Bldg. Credits, Inc. v. Mathewson, 335 Mich. 270, 55
N.W.2d 826 (1952) the buyer won. This was upheld on the ground
that there was sufficient evidence of "notice" so that issue of whether
the financer was a holder in due course could properly go to the jury.
The buyer claimed that the relationship between seller and financer
was so close that the seller was a branch of the financer. The court
said: "We decline without further proof to find the intimate relation-
ship between the 2 companies as claimed by defendant. We do, how-
ever, hold with the trial judge that there was sufficient proof of notice
to the plaintiff so that it became a jury question whether plaintiff was
a holder in due course without notice." Id. at 274, 55 N.W.2d at 828.
The court then proceeded to discuss briefly several aspects of the
testimony and concluded the case was a close one on the facts. I
cannot determine whether the financer and seller relationship was one
of the relevant facts on the issue of the financer's being a holder in due
course or not. Apparently it was not, but it is hard to say definitely.
A subsequent federal case is United States v. Roberts, 115 F. Supp.
786 (E.D. Mich. 1953) in which the buyer won because the application
for the loan (for housing improvements) was made to the financer,
and further that the financer was familiar with these transactions
and knew it should not discount the loan without receiving a comple-
tion certificate signed by the buyer (under FHA regulations).
Minnesofa:
First & Lumberman's Nat'l Bank v. Buchholz, 220 Minn. 97, 18
N.W.2d 771 (1945) is the only relevant case I have found. It held
that it was possible that when the financer became assignee of both
conditional sales contract and note, before the consideration had
passed, "he takes such note with notice of a condition to liability on
the instrument and is prevented from becoming a holder in due
course." Id. at 102, 18 N.W.2d at 774. Hence, he was subject to the
defense of breach of warranty. The case purported to apply Wiscon-
sin law, not that of Minnesota. However, see the discussion of Imple-
ment Credit Corp. v. Elsinger, under Wisconsin. See also State Bank
v. Lovrenz, 163 Minn. 18, 203 N.W. 427 (1925) where financer-plain-
tiff was an auctioneer for seller and took notes for sows purchased
by buyer, knowing of a warranty. He was held to be a holder in due
course and hence free of defense of breach of warranty.
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Mississippi:
I have found no case in Mississippi that treats the question explic-
itly. However, in cases involving the basic fact situation, the financer
won. See for example, Roberts v. International Harvester Co., 181
Miss. 440, 179 So. 745, motion for new trial and modified judgment
overruled (assertion of agency), ibid., 180 So. 747 (1938) ; Universal
Credit Co. v. Moore, 173 Miss. 740, 163 So. 142 (1935) ; General Con-
tract Corp. v. Leggett, 224 Miss. 262, 79 So. 2d 843 (1955) (no im-
plied agency for seller to collect despite close operating relationship).
Missouri:
Another of the "leading cases" against the finance company is
Taylor v. Atlas Security Co., 213 Mo. App. 282, 249 S.W. 746 (1923).
However, the facts are fairly extreme: the buyer and his wife were
uneducated negroes-the husband could not read-who were de-
frauded by the seller; the note was payable to the financer. The re-
lations between seller and financer were unusually close. There were
strong indicates of actual knowledge by the financer of the fraud.
There are, moreover, subsequent cases, perhaps more typical, in which
the financer won. Morgan v. Mulcahey, 298 S.W. 242 (Mo. App.
1927) ; Hunt v. Dean, 72 S.W.2d 831 (Mo. App. 1934) ; Local Finance
Co. v. Charlton, 289 S.W.2d 157 (Mo. App. 1956); Gale and Co. v.
Medley, 289 S.W.2d 460 (Mo. App. 1956). However, there is an-
other subsequent Missouri case in which the financer lost, either on
the ground that there was an installment overdue when it purchased
or because the financer did not prove that it was a holder in due
course (presumably because it had the burden to do so under Ne-
gotiable Instruments Law § 59, although the point is not made clear).
Progressive Finance and Realty Co. v. Stempel, 231 Mo. App. 721, 95
S.W.2d 834 (1936).
Monfana:
The particular fact situation exists but is not discussed and the fi-
nancer won in Baker State Bank v. Grant, 54 Mont. 7, 166 Pac. 27
(1917) (the only case I found).
Nebraska:
A relatively early case, First Nat'l Bank v. Newton, 119 Neb. 394,
229 N.W. 334 (1930), held for the financer. However, in Von Nord-
heim v. Cornelius, 129 Neb. 719, 262 N.W. 832 (1935) the buyer won
because the defense was want of consideration and the note and se-
curity device (referred to by the court both as a mortgage and as a
conditional sales contract), being attached and assigned together, the
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note may be rendered non-negotiable. Or, the financer was charged
with notice of the terms of the contract including the considera-
tion that was to be furnished. Hence (?) he was not a holder in due
course. (I am not clear on the basis of the decision.) In any event,
he took the note subject to defenses.
Nevada:
I have found no cases in Nevada.
New Hampshire:
Financer won in Franklin Discount Co. v. Murphy, 98 N.H. 31, 93
A.2d 669 (1953). However, there is no discussion of the points at
issue here.
New Jersey:
In one early case the financer lost when he brought replevin when
there was a defense under a conditional sales contract, Auto Broker-
age Co. v. Ullrich, 102 N.J.L. 341, 131 Atl. 901 (1926), but won when
he sued on the note, Auto Brokerage Co. v. Ullrich, 4 N.J. Misc. 808,
134 Atl. 885 (1926). Similarly in a later case the financer (its as-
signee, really) lost in an action against the buyer because it did not
follow the procedure outlined in the Uniform Conditional Sales Act in
selling the property; hence, the buyer was discharged. Veterans Loan
Authority v. Rozella, 21 N.J. Super. 1, 90 A.2d 505 (1952). I have
found no other case in which the buyer won. In Mutual Finance Corp.
t'. Dickerson, 123 N.J.L. 62, 7 A.2d 859 (1939) the relation between
financer and seller was spelt out in considerable detail. However, the
financer won. See also B.A.C. Corp. v. Circucci, 131 N.J.L. 93, 35
A.2d 36 (1944) and Eastern Acceptance Corp. v. Kavlick, 10 N.J.
Super. 253, 77 A.2d 49 (1950) where the financer also won.
New Mexico:
The buyer won in the only case I have found, State Nat'l Bank v.
Cantrell, 47 N.M. 389, 143 P.2d 592 (1943) because, since he was
assignee of the contract as well, he had to assume its burdens (de-
fense of failure of consideration) as well as its benefits. This point is
annotated in 152 A.L.R. 1216-22 (1944).
New York:
There are cases in New York for almost every conceivable position.
However, I have found no case in the Court of Appeals and, conse-
quently, one is even less able to say what "the law" is here than one
usually is. Many cases hold for the financer. Thus, for example, Pe-
troleum Acceptance Corp. v. Queen Anne Laundry Service, 38 N.Y.S.
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2d 675 (Sup. Ct. 1942) ; Credit Alliance Corp. v. Buffalo Linen Supply
Co., 238 App. Div. 18, 263 N.Y. Supp. 39 (4th Dep't 1933) ; Commer-
cial Credit Corp. v. Smith, 143 Misc. 478, 256 N.Y. Supp. 759 (1932) ;
United States v. Novsam Realty Co., 125 F.2d 456 (2d Cir. 1942).
Those which hold for the buyer usually do so on the ground that the
note and conditional sales contract must be considered as one docu-
ment and defenses good against the assignee of the contract are good
against the endorsee of the note. Thus, Colonial Discount Co. v.
Rumens, 249 App. Div. 736, 291 N.Y. Supp. 676 (2d Dep't 1936),
aff'd, 274 N.Y. 612, 10 N.E.2d 576 (1937) ; C.LT. v. Joffe, 157 Misc.
225, 283 N.Y. Supp. 881 (1935), rev'd on other grounds, 162 Misc.
328, 293 N.Y. Supp. 659 (1937); Federal Credit Bureau, Inc. v.
Zelkor Dining Car Corp., 238 App. Div. 379, 266 N.Y. Supp. 920 (1st
Dep't 1933); Heiman v. Murphy, 143 Misc. 81, 256 N.Y. Supp. 20
(1932). One municipal court case held for the buyer on the ground
that the financer-seller relation was in fact a joint enterprise, Buffalo
Industrial Bank v. De Marzio, 162 Misc. 742, 296 N.Y. Supp. 783
(1937), rev'd on other grounds, 6 N.Y.S.2d 568 (Sup. Ct. 1937). In
a case in which the note was given for a furnace to be installed under
an FHA insured loan, the financer was said not to be a holder in due
course since it took an assignment of the note without insisting on
all the documents it knew the FHA required, Lincoln Nat'l Bank &
Trust Co. v. Marsh, 24 N.Y.S.2d 281 (Sup. Ct. 1940). See also United
States v. Hansett, 30 F. Supp. 455 (E.D.N.Y. 1939).
North Carolina:
There are two recent decisions for the buyer. In Whitfield v. Caro-
lina Housing & Mortgage Corp., 243 N.C. 658, 92 S.E.2d 78 (1956)
the court held that the financer was not a holder in due course because
of its close relation to the seller though its reasoning in not spelt out.
In Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Currin, 244 N.C. 120, 92 S.E.2d
658 (1956) the court held inter alia that a fairly typical financer was
not a holder in due course, and was thus subject to defenses.
North Dakota:
Advance-Rumely Threshing Co. v. Geyer, 40 N.D. 18, 168 N.W. 731
(1918) holds for the buyer on somewhat unusual facts. The plaintiff
holder of the note was formed to take over the assets of the manu-
facturing company. The note was given to a distributing company
which paid for goods from the manufacturing company with its
customers' notes. It had so transferred the note in suit. The court
declared the plaintiff was in the shoes of the manufacturing company
and the manufacturing company and the distributing company were
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in fact one concern despite the fiction of corporate separation. This
the court would look through. The Kansas court in Advance-Rumely
Thresher Co. v. West refused to do this.
Ohio:
There are Ohio cases in which the financer won since he did not
know of the defense at the time the note was negotiated to him and
was otherwise a holder in due course. There was no discussion of the
relationship, if any. Anchor Loan Co. v. Willett, 137 N.E.2d 532
(Ohio C.P. 1956) ; National City Bank v. Erskine & Son, 65 Ohio L.
Abs. 51, 110 N.E.2d 593 (1951) ; 158 Ohio St. 450, 110 N.E.2d 598
(1953) ; Motor Finance Corp. v. Huntsberger, 116 Ohio St. 317, 156
N.E. 111 (1927). However, in McCurdy v. Stevens, 30 Ohio App.
545, 165 N.E. 855 (1928), the court held that the financer was either
an interested party or a medium through which the financer-manu-
facturer sought to escape liability. See also Bank v. Wendel, 100 Ohio
St. 47, 125 N.E. 111 (1919), where the buyer won though the facts
are a little unusual perhaps. In Davis v. Commercial Credit Corp.,
87 Ohio App. 311, 94 N.E.2d 710 (1950), a judgment for the buyer
against the financer and seller for fraud was affirmed. This was
chiefly because the financer had actual knowledge of the seller's fraud.
In pointing out the facts that indicated this, the court mentioned, id.
at 316, 94 N.E.2d at 713, that the financer had furnished the seller
"with the printed forms, which were long documents containing
credit statements, promissory notes and completion statements .. .
It also cited the Arkansas case of Commercial Credit Co. v. Childs.
Oklahoma:
In Mayer v. American Finance Corp., 172 Okla. 419, 45 P.2d 497
(1935) the financer won and it was pointed out that the fact that the
financer had furnished the seller with printed forms providing for
the assignment back to the financer did not make the seller the fi-
nancer's agent. In that case the security device was a chattel mort-
gage and the action was replevin. In an earlier case the financer, as
the assignee of a note and conditional sales contract, was held subject
to the defenses of the buyer because it was asserting its rights under
the contract by bringing replevin. However, there were no defenses
proved. Mercantile Trust Co. v. Roland, 143 Okla. 190, 288 Pac. 300
(1930).
Oregon:
I have found no cases in Oregon. Albany State Bank v. Anthony,
121 Ore. 277, 254 Pac. 806 (1927) held that a note that included all
of the terms of a conditional sales contract was non-negotiable.
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Pennsylvania:
In general the few Pennsylvania cases that I have found seem to
go for the financer without much difficulty. Fried v. Feola, 129 F.
Supp. 699 (W.D. Pa. 1954); First Nat'l Bank v. Hartman Co., 147
Pa. 396, 24 A.2d 582 (1942); Commercial Credit Corp. v. Kozokas, 37
Luzerne L. Reg. 399 (Pa. C.P. 1941) ; International Finance Co. v.
Magilansky, 105 Pa. Super. 309, 161 Atl. 613 (1932). However, in
Sisemore & Kierbow Co. v. Nicholas, 149 Pa. Super. 376, 27 A.2d 473
(1942), the seller was held to be the financer's selling agent. Hence,
the financer was not a holder in due course. Though the situation is
a little different from the usual one since the purported financer was
the manufacturer of the goods, the court's list of factors that showed
the financer's connection with the transaction is typical of most of
these arrangements. See also Ubaldini v. C.I.T., 122 Pa. Super. 428,
186 Atl. 198 (1936), where buyer paid seller after assignment to fi-
nancer, and payment was a defense against financer. At the present
time, in addition to the Uniform Commercial Code, there is a statute
in Pennsylvania which provides that no installment sale for a motor
vehicle "shall require or entail the execution of any note or series of
notes by the buyer, which when separately negotiated, will cut off,
as to third parties, any right of action or defense which the buyer
may have against the original seller." Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 69, § 615
(Purdon Supp. 1957).
Rhode Island:
In an action by the buyer against the seller for breach of warranty,
it was held proper to include as an item of damage a note paid to the
financer after repudiation by the buyer of the contract. The bank
became a holder in due course before notice of the breach and hence
was entitled to be paid regardless of a breach of warranty. Thus, it
was no waiver of the breach of warranty against the seller by the
buyer to pay this installment to the financer. Swartz v. Edwards
Motor Car Co., 49 R.I. 18, 139 Atl. 466 (1927).
Soufh Carolina:
The financer won in Continental Illinois Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v.
Hendrix Co., 186 S.C. 268, 195 S.E. 562 (1938) ; see Carolina Housing
& Mortgage Corp. v. Reynolds, 96 S.E.2d 485 (S.C. 1957). But see
Bank of Commerce v. Waters, 215 S.C. 543, 56 S.E.2d 350 (1949),
where a combination note and conditional sales contract was held non-
negotiable
Soufh Dakofa:
Apparently in South Dakota if the financer attempts to enforce, or
is even 'the assignee, of a conditional sales contract as well as of a
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note, he is subject to defenses that are available against the seller.
General Electric Contract Corp. v. Heimstra, 69 S.D. 78, 6 N.W.2d
445 (1942) ; C.I:T. v. Wesling, 53 S.D. 337, 220 N.W. 855 (1928).
However, see Fischer v. Timber Lake Supply Co., 61 S.D. 15, 246
N.W. 97 (1932), in which the financer was held to be a holder in due
course of the note and hence not bound by a special agreement about
payment between buyer and seller that was not contained in the con-
ditional sales contract. Otherwise the question does not seem to have
been considered.
Tennessee:
In Third Nat'l Bank v. Keathley, 35 Tenn. App. 82, 242 S.W.2d 760
(1951) the financer won. The financer had regular dealings with the
seller and normally relied on his word as to the credit standing of the
buyer. However, in Wright v. Batchelor Motor Co., 2 Tenn. App. 468
(1926) where the question is what rights to resale the assignee of a
conditional sales contract got, the court said that he succeeded to the
benefits "and burdens" of the original seller. But see Nabors v. Hamil-
ton Trust & Savings Bank, 2 Tenn. App. 523 (1926) where the fi-
nancer won in an action on a note.
Texas:
No case has been found in Texas in which the financer lost because
he was a financer. On the other hand, no case has been found in which
the business relationship was considered except where the defense
was usury, and in Texas a usurious note is void even in the hands of
a holder in due course. See National Bond & Investment Co. v. Atkin-
son, 254 S.W.2d 885 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952) ; Continental Nat'l Bank
v. Conner, 147 Tex. 218, 214 S.W.2d 928 (1948). There are cases
where the financer won. Intges v. People's Finance & Thrift Co., 44
S.W.2d 1028 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931) ; International Harvester Co. v.
Newberry, 16 S.W.2d 871 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929); C. H. Mountjoy
Parts Co. v. San Antonio Nat'l Bank, 12 S.W.2d 609 (Tex. Civ. App.
1928) ; Scrivner v. Federal Credit Bureau, 12 S.W.2d 592 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1928) ; Harty v. Keokuk Savings Bank, 201 S.W. 419 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1918). Where the purported financer was the manufacturer, it
lost, as it did when through its close continuing relation with the
financer, it was held to know the seller was doing business in Texas
though not qualified and that the seller had given a warranty that
might be breached. International Harvester Co. v. Newberry, 16
S.W.2d 871 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929) ; Southern Discount Co. v. Rose,
290 S.W. 861 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927). Financers have also lost on the
ground that since they were assigned the conditional sales contract
as well as the note, they took with notice that the consideration might
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fail (as it did). Sloan Lumber Co. v. Ambrose, 26 S.W. 2d 348 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1930). In another case, the financer required a "completion
certificate" (indicating that the work had been done) before it would
accept paper from the seller. It furnished the forms. All of this
made the financer an "original party" to the transaction and not a
holder in due course. Allied Building Credits, Inc. v. Ellis, 258 S.W.2d
165 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953).
Utah:
I have found no cases in Utah, though the clause in a sales contract
waiving defenses against assignees was upheld in Anglo-California
Trust Co. v. Hall, 61 Utah 223, 211 Pac. 991 (1922).
Washington:
No very relevant case has been found. The buyer won in Vancouver
Nat'l Bank v. Starr, 123 Wash. 58, 211 Pac. 746 (1923) because the
note was held non-negotiable owing to additional promises. In Yakima
Finance Corp. v. Mullins, 138 Wash. 699, 245 Pac. 5 (1926) the fi-
nancer knew that the seller had planned to have the last (and largest)
of a group of notes given for an automobile paid by legal services to
be rendered by the buyer to the seller. This did not prevent it from
being a holder in due course which could recover from the buyer.
West Virginia:
Commercial Credit Co. v. Barnett, 116 W. Va. 132, 178 S.E. 816
(1935) holds for the financer. The financer negotiated for some time
with the seller to get him to put the documents in such shape that it
would buy them. It was dissatified with the buyer's credit rating and
wanted accommodation endorsers.
Wisconsin:
Implement Credit Corp. v. Elsinger, 268 Wis. 143, 66 N.W.2d 657
(1954) is one of the few cases that goes into the relationship between
financer and seller in considerable detail and yet holds for the seller.
See also Shawano Finance Corp. v. Julius, 214 Wis. 637. 254 N.W. 355
(1934) where the financer won although the financer-seller relation-
ship is not considered. The Minnesota court, in applying Wisconsin
law, in First & Lumberman's Nat'l Bank v. Buchholz, would appear to
be contra. At any rate it reached the opposite result.
Wyoming:
Financer won in People's Finance & Thrift Co. v. De Berry, 50
Wyo. 301, 62 P.2d 307 (1936).
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